U.S. intelligence activities in Argentina: Difference between revisions

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{{main|CIA activities in the Americas}}
{{main|CIA activities in the Americas}}
Intelligence and police issues need to be understood in the context of [[Argentina]]'s political system. In the USA, the Executive Branch, and the Intelligence Community within it, are, at least in principle, subject to the oversight of Congress, and potentially to judicial review. There are barriers between intelligence and law enforcement, theoretically impervious in the case of the CIA and NSA, and carefully controlled with the FBI. Police are largely decentralized at the state and local level. While there will be differences, especially with a parliamentary system, most European countries, as well as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, have a workable set of controls, with continuing improvement.
Intelligence and police issues need to be understood in the context of [[Argentina]]'s political system. In the USA, the Executive Branch, and the Intelligence Community within it, are, at least in principle, subject to the oversight of Congress, and potentially to judicial review. There are barriers between intelligence and law enforcement, theoretically impervious in the case of the CIA and NSA, and carefully controlled with the FBI. Police are largely decentralized at the state and local level. While there will be differences, especially with a parliamentary system, most European countries, as well as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, have a workable set of controls, with continuing improvement.
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Argentina, however, historically has not had such controls.
Argentina, however, historically has not had such controls.
==Security and intelligence services of Argentina==
==Security and intelligence services of Argentina==
{{main|Argentina}}
The Argentine system is, in some respects, more decentralized, and, in other respects, more decentralized than the US intelligence community. There is no equivalent to the US [[Director of National Intelligence]], but there is a National Intelligence Center (CNI) that has a coordinating rather than management role. CNI, in principle, is responsible for medium and long-term analysis, while the State Intelligence Secretary (SIDE) is responsible for short-term strategic intelligence.
In the Argentine context, "security forces" are intermediate forces  between police forces (provincial and federal) and the armed forces. They are coordinated, rather than commanded, by the National Direction of Internal Intelligence, located in the Interior Ministry. Still, they are national organizations, without decentralized police: the Naval Prefecture, National Gendarmerie, Federal Police Force, and Local Police Forces.
In Argentina, there is no law regulating the powers or providing for accountability and control over the activities of the intelligence agencies.  
In Argentina, there is no law regulating the powers or providing for accountability and control over the activities of the intelligence agencies.  
<blockquote>For Argentina, the consolidation of democracy is still the main political challenge in the twenty-first century. And within this overdue task, one of the most problematic issues is the control of the intelligence apparatus. It is problematic not only because of its historical relationship with the military dictatorship, but also because it is a complicated issue in the most well established democracies.<ref name=Balestra>{{citation
<blockquote>For Argentina, the consolidation of democracy is still the main political challenge in the twenty-first century. And within this overdue task, one of the most problematic issues is the control of the intelligence apparatus. It is problematic not only because of its historical relationship with the military dictatorship, but also because it is a complicated issue in the most well established democracies.<ref name=Balestra>{{citation
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  | first = Florencia | last = Fontan Balestra
  | first = Florencia | last = Fontan Balestra
  | url = http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/criminal-justice/argentina.pdf
  | url = http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/criminal-justice/argentina.pdf
}}</ref>.</blockquote>
}}</ref>.</blockquote>  
 
There still needs to be external control, but a basic internal control mechanism is
<blockquote>
... the separation of the intelligence community into different agencies. Although this might reduce effectiveness, it eliminates the dangers of domination and monopoly by a single agency. The separation must be accompanied by a clear delimitation of responsibilities by each agency, trying not to overlap functions in a single one. A common way to do this is by diving the faculties and jurisdiction into external and internal conflicts.<ref name=Balestra /></blockquote> 
This type of control is only beginning to evolve in Argentina, where
<blockquote>
Argentina’s intelligence community today must be understood within an historical context that includes a recent experience with state terrorism, in which the military-intelligence forces were the principal practitioners of state terror.  During the years of dictatorship, the main role of the Armed Forces in Argentina shifted form defending the country from external aggressions to defending it from its internal enemies.
<ref name=Balestra /></blockquote>
<blockquote>
With the return to democracy many steps were taken to dismantle the authoritarian legacy and the issue of the power and autonomy of the intelligence agencies came into public debate. The considerable autonomy it had from constitutional controls, either legislative or judicial, began to be questioned and gradually began to be reversed.</blockquote>
<blockquote>
As soon as the civilian government assumed power, the members of the military Juntas were tried and convicted for the atrocities they committed during the years of dictatorship. However, lower ranks were granted immunity after the enactment by Congress of two laws: “Punto Final” (Final Point) and “Obediencia de Vida” (Justification Defense). Some other initiatives included the appointment of a civilian as head of the State Intelligence Agency and the functional delimitation of the different components of the intelligence community by the National Defense Law [Law No. 23.554, April 13, 1988] and the Internal Security Law [Law No. 24.059 , December 18, 1991.]
<ref name=Balestra /></blockquote>


The intelligence agencies, moving forward, were not seen as effective or objective. During the 1990s, Argentina experienced terrorism against  the AMIA (Israeli Association) and the Israeli Embassy bombings, with over 100 dead. While responsibility has not been established, [[Hezbollah]] has been reported to have a connection. <ref name=JVL>{{citation
| title = Terrorist Bombings in Argentina (1992-1994)
| author = Jewish Virtual Library
| url = http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/argentina.html}}</ref>
Scandal struck them in August 2000, when the head of the State Intelligence Agency, Fernando de Santibañes, was accused of paying bribes to opposition senators. "The scandal created an institutional crisis within Argentina. The head of the agency and several senators resigned in the last month. Additionally, the vice president Carlos Alvarez also resigned as an act of protest because he believed that the Executive Branch was not actively condemning the episode. A Federal Judge is still investigating the case."<ref name=Balestra />
The Argentine system is, in some respects, more decentralized, and, in other respects, more decentralized than the US intelligence community. There is no equivalent to the US [[Director of National Intelligence]], but there is a National Intelligence Center (CNI) that has a coordinating rather than management role. CNI, in principle, is responsible for medium and long-term analysis, while the State Intelligence Secretary (SIDE) is responsible for short-term strategic intelligence.
SIDE went through major changes in January 2000. First, the civilian head of the agency, Fernando de Santibañes, fired over 1000 employees.  Many of the discharged agents were related to the military dictatorship of the seventies, with histories of extortion, kidnapping, torture, disappearances and assassinations.  A new set of priorities were established: rather than focus on a threat ofinternal and external subversion, the new focus is on "illicit trafficking, corruption, white-collar crime, terrorism, money la undering, organized crime, and the formulation of strategic policies in different areas for the President."<ref name=Balestra />
In the Argentine context, "security forces" are intermediate forces  between police forces (provincial and federal) and the armed forces. They are coordinated, rather than commanded, by the National Direction of Internal Intelligence, located in the Interior Ministry. Still, they are national organizations, without decentralized police: the Naval Prefecture, National Gendarmerie, Federal Police Force, and Local Police Forces.
==General CIA reference==
Argentina, according to the  ''CIA World Factbook'',<ref name=FactbookArg>{{citation
| author = Central Intelligence Agency
| title = The World Factbook
| contribution = Argentina
| url = https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ar.html}}</ref> The country's population and culture were heavily shaped by immigrants from throughout Europe, but most particularly Italy and Spain, which provided the largest percentage of newcomers from 1860 to 1930. Up until about the mid-20th century, much of Argentina's history was dominated by periods of internal political conflict between Federalists and Unitarians and between civilian and military factions. After World War II, an era of Peronist authoritarian rule and interference in subsequent governments was followed by a military junta that took power in 1976. Democracy returned in 1983, and has persisted despite numerous challenges, the most formidable of which was a severe economic crisis in 2001-02 that led to violent public protests and the resignation of several interim presidents. The economy has recovered strongly since bottoming out in 2002.
===Political analysis===
===Economic analysis===
Argentina benefits from rich natural resources, a highly literate population, an export-oriented agricultural sector, and a diversified industrial base. Although one of the world's wealthiest countries 100 years ago, Argentina suffered during most of the 20th century from recurring economic crises, persistent fiscal and current account deficits, high inflation, mounting external debt, and capital flight. A severe depression, growing public and external indebtedness, and a bank run culminated in 2001 in the most serious economic, social, and political crisis in the country's turbulent history. Interim President Adolfo RODRIGUEZ SAA declared a default - the largest in history - on the government's foreign debt in December of that year, and abruptly resigned only a few days after taking office. His successor, Eduardo DUHALDE, announced an end to the peso's decade-long 1-to-1 peg to the US dollar in early 2002. The economy bottomed out that year, with real GDP 18% smaller than in 1998 and almost 60% of Argentines under the poverty line. Real GDP rebounded to grow by an average 9% annually over the subsequent five years, taking advantage of previously idled industrial capacity and labor, an audacious debt restructuring and reduced debt burden, excellent international financial conditions, and expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. Inflation, however, reached double-digit levels in 2006 and the government of President Nestor KIRCHNER responded with "voluntary" price agreements with businesses, as well as export taxes and restraints. Multi-year price freezes on electricity and natural gas rates for residential users stoked consumption and kept private investment away, leading to restrictions on industrial use and blackouts in 2007.
===International===
Argentina continues to assert its claims to the UK-administered Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands in its constitution, forcibly occupying the Falklands in 1982, but in 1995 agreed no longer to seek settlement by force; territorial claim in Antarctica partially overlaps UK and Chilean claims (see Antarctic disputes); unruly region at convergence of Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay borders is locus of money laundering, smuggling, arms and illegal narcotics trafficking, and fundraising for extremist organizations; uncontested dispute between Brazil and Uruguay over Braziliera/Brasiliera Island in the Quarai/Cuareim River leaves the tripoint with Argentina in question; in January 2007, ICJ provisionally ruled Uruguay may begin construction of two paper mills on the Uruguay River, which forms the border with Argentina, while the court examines further whether Argentina has the legal right to stop such construction with potential environmental implications to both countries; the joint boundary commission, established by Chile and Argentina in 2001 has yet to map and demarcate the delimited boundary in the inhospitable Andean Southern Ice Field (Campo de Hielo Sur)
====Trafficking in persons====
Argentina is primarily a destination country for women and children trafficked for sexual and labor exploitation with most victims trafficked internally, from rural to urban areas, for exploitation in prostitution; foreign women and children trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation come primarily from Paraguay, but also from Bolivia, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Chile; Bolivians are trafficked for forced labor; Argentine women and girls are also trafficked to neighboring countries for sexual exploitation
tier rating: Tier 2 Watch List - Argentina failed to show evidence of increasing efforts to combat trafficking particularly in the key area of prosecutions
====Illicit drugs====
Argentina is used as a transshipment country for cocaine headed for Europe; some money-laundering activity, especially in the Tri-Border Area; domestic consumption of drugs in urban centers is increasing
==Specific activities==
==Specific activities==
===Argentina 1975===
===Argentina 1975===
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The 1975-1983 period was the one most vulnerable to excesses, which may have involved foreign forces.  
The 1975-1983 period was the one most vulnerable to excesses, which may have involved foreign forces.  
=====Argentina 1976=====
=====Argentina 1976=====
[[Human Rights Watch]] observed,  
[[Human Rights Watch]] observed,  
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=====Argentina 1983=====
=====Argentina 1983=====
In June 1983, the NGO Americas Watch visited Honduras and stated in its report that "The General Gustavo Alvarez Martínez, head of the Hondurian military staff, has publicly defended the use of the Argentine method to confront the subversive threat in Latin America. As a matter of fact, Alvarez is responsible of having brought to Honduras the first Argentine military instructors, when he was commandant of the Fuerza de Seguridad Pública (Fusep [Public Security Force]).<ref name=HRW-Argentina-US />
In June 1983, the NGO Americas Watch visited Honduras and stated in its report that "The General Gustavo Alvarez Martínez, head of the Hondurian military staff, has publicly defended the use of the Argentine method to confront the subversive threat in Latin America. As a matter of fact, Alvarez is responsible of having brought to Honduras the first Argentine military instructors, when he was commandant of the Fuerza de Seguridad Pública (FUSEP [Public Security Force]).<ref name=HRW-Argentina-US />


=====Argentina 1987=====
=====Argentina 1987=====

Revision as of 13:36, 25 February 2009

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For more information, see: CIA activities in the Americas.

Intelligence and police issues need to be understood in the context of Argentina's political system. In the USA, the Executive Branch, and the Intelligence Community within it, are, at least in principle, subject to the oversight of Congress, and potentially to judicial review. There are barriers between intelligence and law enforcement, theoretically impervious in the case of the CIA and NSA, and carefully controlled with the FBI. Police are largely decentralized at the state and local level. While there will be differences, especially with a parliamentary system, most European countries, as well as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, have a workable set of controls, with continuing improvement.

Argentina, however, historically has not had such controls.

Security and intelligence services of Argentina

For more information, see: Argentina.

The Argentine system is, in some respects, more decentralized, and, in other respects, more decentralized than the US intelligence community. There is no equivalent to the US Director of National Intelligence, but there is a National Intelligence Center (CNI) that has a coordinating rather than management role. CNI, in principle, is responsible for medium and long-term analysis, while the State Intelligence Secretary (SIDE) is responsible for short-term strategic intelligence.

In the Argentine context, "security forces" are intermediate forces between police forces (provincial and federal) and the armed forces. They are coordinated, rather than commanded, by the National Direction of Internal Intelligence, located in the Interior Ministry. Still, they are national organizations, without decentralized police: the Naval Prefecture, National Gendarmerie, Federal Police Force, and Local Police Forces.

In Argentina, there is no law regulating the powers or providing for accountability and control over the activities of the intelligence agencies.

For Argentina, the consolidation of democracy is still the main political challenge in the twenty-first century. And within this overdue task, one of the most problematic issues is the control of the intelligence apparatus. It is problematic not only because of its historical relationship with the military dictatorship, but also because it is a complicated issue in the most well established democracies.[1].

Specific activities

Argentina 1975

A military junta took control, and suspended the constitution, dissolved Congress, imposed strict censorship, and banned all political parties. In addition, it embarked on a campaign of terror against leftist elements in the country. Thousands of leftist opposition supporters were persecuted, illegally imprisoned, tortured and executed without trial. Many of them disappeared and were never again seen by their families. The military dictatorship lasted until 1983, when democratic elections designed Raul Alfonsín (UCR) as President of the country.[1]

The 1975-1983 period was the one most vulnerable to excesses, which may have involved foreign forces.

Argentina 1976

Human Rights Watch observed,

Until the 1976 coup, and for months afterwards, the United States relied to a large extent on the armed forces as its main interlocutors in Argentina's turbulent politics. Unlike in Chile and Uruguay, where the U.S had backed reformist parties (at least until the emergence of a serious left-wing challenge in the early 1970s), it was consistently hostile to the most popular political movement in Argentina, Peronism. In the face of Peron's populist rhetoric, economic nationalism, and fascist sympathies, the military seemed to provide a moderate alternative, favorable to American investment, and just as staunchly anti-communist.[2]

Argentina 1978

"In September 1978, after Vice-President Walter Mondale met Videla in Rome, U.S. Ambassador Raul Castro reported that "General Viola received me smiling broadly and immediately volunteered the observation that he believed the Rome meeting had gone very well... Viola clearly indicated he had received some positive signals from the USG [U.S. government] referring to the release of FMS [Foreign Military Sales] purchases.""[3]

Argentina 1979

"A 1979 telegram reveals how U.S. policy placed U.S. officials in a moral and political predicament while dealing with those responsible for human rights atrocities. At a meeting with General Viola, then-U.S. Ambassador Raul Castro asked him to help clarify the fate of two recent disappeared Montonero insurgents, Mendizabal and Croatto. Viola responded without hesitation, "Mendizabal and Croatto were terrorists ... who were eliminated ... with my authorization."[3]

Argentina 1981

HRW said that the climate for human rights changed radically with the election of President Ronald Reagan. In February 1981, the Administration ordered representatives to "international financial institutions to stop opposing loans on human rights grounds to Argentina and other Southern Cone countries. It began a long certification battle in Congress to resume military sales, loans, and training programs to Argentina, arguing that human rights conditions had dramatically improved. It was true that "disappearances" had declined, but more than a thousand political prisoners were still being held without charges, and temporary "disappearances," arbitrary arrests, and torture continued."[2]

Argentina 1983

In June 1983, the NGO Americas Watch visited Honduras and stated in its report that "The General Gustavo Alvarez Martínez, head of the Hondurian military staff, has publicly defended the use of the Argentine method to confront the subversive threat in Latin America. As a matter of fact, Alvarez is responsible of having brought to Honduras the first Argentine military instructors, when he was commandant of the Fuerza de Seguridad Pública (FUSEP [Public Security Force]).[2]

Argentina 1987

In the landmark case of Forti v. Suárez Mason (1987),[4][5] the Court held that torturers were hostis humani generis and thus subject to the jurisdiction of any country, even though the acts had not taken place in that country, and the parties were not citizens of that country.

Further, a commander could be held liable for tortures performed by subordinates, as in the doctrine of command responsibility. "The defendant in all but one of the cases was Gen. Carlos Guillermo Suárez Mason, whose clandestine presence in the U.S after fleeing prosecution in Argentina triggered lawsuits from several of his victims. As commander of the First Army Corps, Suárez Mason participated in the preparation of the 1976 coup, oversaw the operations of task forces, and was ultimately responsible for secret detention camps in the densely populated region comprising Buenos Aires and its suburbs, La Plata, Mar del Plata, and smaller cities."[2]

Martínez Baca v. Suárez Mason (1988) used the Filartiga precedent

Argentina 1989

In Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic (1989),[6], the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of a ship that had been attacked by Argentine aircraft during the Falklands War. While this was not an explicit human rights case, it added to the body of law of jurisdiction over extraterritorial events.

Ouiros de Rapaport v. Suárez Mason, (1989), followed in the steps of Filartiga.

Argentina, date uncertain

"The other face of U.S. policy toward Argentina at this time was shown by the sympathetic treatment Suárez Mason received from certain U.S. authorities. ...Oliver North", a National Security Council staff member who often acted independently of the CIA, although he arranged orders to be given to the agency, was :reported to have arranged a false visa for Suárez to enter the United States. North had reportedly been discussing with him the possible establishment of a pan-American counterinsurgency force, a proposal that emerged out of ongoing cooperation between the CIA and the Argentine military, in which Suárez Mason was an important actor.

Argentina 1992

Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina (1992) again used the precedent in Filartiga.

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 Fontan Balestra, Florencia, Towards a Democratic Control of Argentina's Intelligence Community.
  2. 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 , XI. The Role of the United States, Argentina: Reluctant Partner. The Argentine Government's Failure to Back Trials of Human Rights Violators, December 2001
  3. 3.0 3.1 The Pentagon and the CIA Sent Mixed Message to the Argentine Military: The Argentine Generals were "told by U.S. government officials" that Washington was "not serious and committed" to human rights, vol. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 85, March 28, 2003
  4. Forti v. Suarez-Mason,  672 F. Supp 1531 (US Circuit Court for the Northern District of California 1987)
  5. Public Broadcasting System (WNET), Filartiga and Its Progeny: From Perpetrator to Commander
  6. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., et al.',  488 U.S. 428 (Supreme Court of the United States 30 June 1989)