Russian Liberation Army: Difference between revisions

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Formed from a nucleus of Soviet soldiers captured by the German [[Wehrmacht]] in the [[Second World War]], the '''Russian Liberation Army (RLA)''' neither achieved German nor anti-Soviet objectives. While it had its supporters in the German command structure, it never received full support due to Nazi anti-Slavic doctrine. After the war's end, the Soviets were harsh on those it reasonably considered enemies of the state. Due to lack of effective German support, it never was more than a "symbolic initiative versus a real fighting force."<ref name=Willis>{{citation  
Formed from a nucleus of Soviet soldiers captured by the German [[Wehrmacht]] in the [[Second World War]], the '''Russian Liberation Army (RLA), (ROA)''' [Russian abbreviation] neither achieved German nor anti-Soviet objectives. While it had its supporters in the German command structure, it never received full support due to Nazi anti-Slavic doctrine. After the war's end, the Soviets were harsh on those it reasonably considered enemies of the state. Due to lack of effective German support, it never was more than a "symbolic initiative versus a real fighting force."<ref name=Willis>{{citation  
  | url = http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA436298
  | url = http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA436298
  | title = After the Blitzkrieg: The German Army’s Transition to Defeat in the East
  | title = After the Blitzkrieg: The German Army’s Transition to Defeat in the East
Line 7: Line 7:
  | publisher = School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army [[Command and General Staff College]]  
  | publisher = School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army [[Command and General Staff College]]  
  | date = Academic Year 2004-2005}}, p. 27</ref>   
  | date = Academic Year 2004-2005}}, p. 27</ref>   
 
==Vlasov==
With exceptions, Germany simply was unprepared to fight on an effective political and psychological level, dooming any Russian resistance.  As an example, General [[Walter von Reichenau]], commanding the  German Sixth Army in the invasion, penned his own order that “historic and cultural values do not have any significance.<ref name=Grenkevich>{{citation
While the RLA was under the command of former Red Army [[lieutenant general]] <ref>A Soviet lieutenant general is equivalent to a two-star Western [[major general]]</ref> [[Andrei Vlasov]] (1900-1946), the Germans never fully armed it nor gave it an adequate command structure. Instead, they regarded it as the putative military wing of the German-created [[Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia]] (KONR).  Vlasov was tried by the Soviets and executed in 1946.<ref name=RFE>{{citation
| Leonid Grenkevich
| title = The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1944
| publisher = Frank Cass and Company | year = 1999}}, p. 9, ''cited by'' Willis</ref>  The movement, surprisingly given the racial theories of the [[Schutzstaffel]], did have the support of [[Heinrich Himmler]], but "continuously derailed by Hitler’s refusal to alter his policy on limited self-rule and the creation of an autonomous Russian Army in the occupied areas...From historical hindsight however, it is clear that Stalin and the Soviet government effectively tapped into the Russian cultural consciousness whereas Hitler and the German Army proved unable, or unwilling, to do the same."<ref>Willis, p. 43</ref>
 
While the RLA was under the command of former Red Army [[lieutenant general]]<ref>A Soviet lieutenant general is equivalent to a two-star Western [[major general]]</ref> [[Andrei Vlasov]], the Germans never fully armed it nor gave it an adequate command structure. Instead, they regarded it as the putative military wing of the German-created [[Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia]] (KONR).  Vlasov was tried by the Soviets and executed in 1946.<ref name=RFE>{{citation
  | url = http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/300/8/3/text/68-1-258.shtml
  | url = http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/300/8/3/text/68-1-258.shtml
  | publisher = [[Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty|Radio Free Europe Research]]
  | publisher = [[Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty|Radio Free Europe Research]]
  | title = General Vlasov's Last Hours
  | title = General Vlasov's Last Hours
  | date = 27 April 1973}}</ref>          
  | date = 27 April 1973}}</ref>   The Soviet trial record says "Here is where things got bogged down. The prisoners
of war refused to serve in the ROA. With the greatest
of effort, Vlasov was able to recruit people for the
second division. Hitlerites who were aware of the
pro-Soviet mood among the majority of the soldiers in
this division, provided them with no weapons until the
end of the war."
 
Even though the number of anti-Soviets may have been in the millions, Vlasov was only allowed to form a two [[division]] force in January 1945. <ref name=Andreyev>{{citation
| title = Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement: Soviet Reality and Emigré Theories
  | author = Catherine Andreyev
| url = http://books.google.com/books?id=ORYvFXeW8OAC&printsec=frontcover&dq=%22Vlasov+and+the+Russian+Liberation+Movement%22&source=bl&ots=PdegpMPY6h&sig=AhF9lNLexOy-gL1r094NPKeB9WU&hl=en&ei=IuGRS_WpDtaOtgfEnI3VCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CBIQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=&f=false
| publisher = Cambridge University Press
| year = 1987
| isbn = 9780521389600
}}, p. 3</ref> No personal papers of Vlasov are known to exist.
 
While the Soviet official position was that he was merely an opportunist, his commander, Marshal K. A. Meretskov, said the defeat of his force in 1942 was due to more than his choice. <ref>Andreyev, p. 10</ref> Vlasov, as opposed to his subordinates, never wore a German uniform. He joined the Red Army in 1919, and rose through the ranks, entering the Communist Party in 1930.<ref>Andreyev, pp. 19-21</ref>
 
At his trial, which started on 30 July 1946, the Soviet record states all responses were voluntary. <ref>A.V. Tishkov: "Predatel' pered sovetskim sudom" in Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo" No. 2/1973, cited by RFE</ref> Vlasov was quoted as saying "I took advantage of the invasion of the Germans in the village where I was and surrendered voluntarily,"
 


==German concept==
With exceptions, Germany simply was unprepared to fight on an effective political and psychological level, dooming any Russian resistance. 
===Opposition===
As an example, General [[Walter von Reichenau]], commanding the  German Sixth Army in the invasion, penned his own order that “historic and cultural values do not have any significance.<ref name=Grenkevich>{{citation
| author = Leonid Grenkevich
| title = The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1944
| publisher = Frank Cass and Company | year = 1999}}, p. 9, ''cited by'' Willis</ref>  The movement, surprisingly given the racial theories of the [[Schutzstaffel]], did have the support of [[Heinrich Himmler]], but "continuously derailed by Hitler’s refusal to alter his policy on limited self-rule and the creation of an autonomous Russian Army in the occupied areas...From historical hindsight however, it is clear that Stalin and the Soviet government effectively tapped into the Russian cultural consciousness whereas Hitler and the German Army proved unable, or unwilling, to do the same."<ref>Willis, p. 43</ref>       
==Support==
Key to establishing the preconditions for the RLA was Captain Wilfried Strik-Strikfeldt, an ethnic Baltic German who had served in the Imperial Russian Army during World War I.<ref>{{citation
| author = Wilfried Strik-Strikfeldt
| title = Against Stalin and Hitler: Memoir of the Russian Liberation Movement, 1941-1945  | publisher = Macmillan | year = 1970}}</ref> He joined to join German Army Group Center in 1941, serving on Russian affairs as special advisor to Field Marshal [[Fedor von Bock]]. His official role was to train Russian propagandists for the German military. His personal goal, in the special camp he established at Dabendorf near Berlin, to form a resistance army.<ref>Willis, pp. 40-41</ref>
==Soviet countermeasures==
Even though the Soviets did not do well in preventing the formation of the RLA, they had significant intelligence penetration of German-sponsored resistance movements. Boris Miklashevsky was a former boxing champion and clandestine intelligence officer, resident in Berlin between 1941 and 1944. After the war's end, he was assigned to hunting down RLA forces; he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and returned to boxing in 1947.<ref name = Sudoplatov>{{cite book   
Even though the Soviets did not do well in preventing the formation of the RLA, they had significant intelligence penetration of German-sponsored resistance movements. Boris Miklashevsky was a former boxing champion and clandestine intelligence officer, resident in Berlin between 1941 and 1944. After the war's end, he was assigned to hunting down RLA forces; he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and returned to boxing in 1947.<ref name = Sudoplatov>{{cite book   
  | author = [[Pavel Sudoplatov]]
  | author = [[Pavel Sudoplatov]]
Line 26: Line 53:
  | year = 1994  
  | year = 1994  
  | isbn = 0316773522}}, pp. 115-116</ref>
  | isbn = 0316773522}}, pp. 115-116</ref>
==German preparation==
Key to establishing the preconditions for the RLA was Captain Wilfried Strik-Strikfeldt, an ethnic Baltic German who had served in the Imperial Russian Army during World War I.<ref>{{citation
| author = Wilfried Strik-Strikfeldt
| title = Against Stalin and Hitler: Memoir of the Russian Liberation Movement, 1941-1945  | publisher = Macmillan | year = 1970}}</ref> He joined to join German Army Group Center in 1941, serving on Russian affairs as special advisor to Field Marshal [[Fedor von Bock]]. His official role was to train Russian propagandists for the German military. His personal goal, in the special camp he established at Dabendorf near Berlin, to form a resistance army.<ref>Willis, pp. 40-41</ref>
== Declared foundation of the Russian liberation movement: Proponent angle ==
== Declared foundation of the Russian liberation movement: Proponent angle ==


Line 39: Line 62:


Germany was seen as a nation with positive associations, because it was part of a European traditionally shared cultural community. It also had a certain effect that it was a practising Christian society, as opposed to the Soviet Union, in which the state had made a substantial and rather heavy-handed effort to eliminate religious practice.
Germany was seen as a nation with positive associations, because it was part of a European traditionally shared cultural community. It also had a certain effect that it was a practising Christian society, as opposed to the Soviet Union, in which the state had made a substantial and rather heavy-handed effort to eliminate religious practice.
===Vlasov===
The figurehead of the movement was Lieutenant General [[Andrey Andreyevich Vlasov]], a decorated war hero, who had made his way up through the ranks of the [[Red Army]], based on merit. In the autobiography of one of the leaders of the Southern Front, responsible for the defence of [[Kiev]] – and later General Secretary [[Nikita Khrushchev]].


After the defeat of his 2nd Shock Army in the summer of 1942, Vlasov was captured by German forces.  
After the defeat of his 2nd Shock Army in the summer of 1942, Vlasov was captured by German forces.  

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Formed from a nucleus of Soviet soldiers captured by the German Wehrmacht in the Second World War, the Russian Liberation Army (RLA), (ROA) [Russian abbreviation] neither achieved German nor anti-Soviet objectives. While it had its supporters in the German command structure, it never received full support due to Nazi anti-Slavic doctrine. After the war's end, the Soviets were harsh on those it reasonably considered enemies of the state. Due to lack of effective German support, it never was more than a "symbolic initiative versus a real fighting force."[1]

Vlasov

While the RLA was under the command of former Red Army lieutenant general [2] Andrei Vlasov (1900-1946), the Germans never fully armed it nor gave it an adequate command structure. Instead, they regarded it as the putative military wing of the German-created Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (KONR). Vlasov was tried by the Soviets and executed in 1946.[3] The Soviet trial record says "Here is where things got bogged down. The prisoners of war refused to serve in the ROA. With the greatest of effort, Vlasov was able to recruit people for the second division. Hitlerites who were aware of the pro-Soviet mood among the majority of the soldiers in this division, provided them with no weapons until the end of the war."

Even though the number of anti-Soviets may have been in the millions, Vlasov was only allowed to form a two division force in January 1945. [4] No personal papers of Vlasov are known to exist.

While the Soviet official position was that he was merely an opportunist, his commander, Marshal K. A. Meretskov, said the defeat of his force in 1942 was due to more than his choice. [5] Vlasov, as opposed to his subordinates, never wore a German uniform. He joined the Red Army in 1919, and rose through the ranks, entering the Communist Party in 1930.[6]

At his trial, which started on 30 July 1946, the Soviet record states all responses were voluntary. [7] Vlasov was quoted as saying "I took advantage of the invasion of the Germans in the village where I was and surrendered voluntarily,"


German concept

With exceptions, Germany simply was unprepared to fight on an effective political and psychological level, dooming any Russian resistance.

Opposition

As an example, General Walter von Reichenau, commanding the German Sixth Army in the invasion, penned his own order that “historic and cultural values do not have any significance.[8] The movement, surprisingly given the racial theories of the Schutzstaffel, did have the support of Heinrich Himmler, but "continuously derailed by Hitler’s refusal to alter his policy on limited self-rule and the creation of an autonomous Russian Army in the occupied areas...From historical hindsight however, it is clear that Stalin and the Soviet government effectively tapped into the Russian cultural consciousness whereas Hitler and the German Army proved unable, or unwilling, to do the same."[9]

Support

Key to establishing the preconditions for the RLA was Captain Wilfried Strik-Strikfeldt, an ethnic Baltic German who had served in the Imperial Russian Army during World War I.[10] He joined to join German Army Group Center in 1941, serving on Russian affairs as special advisor to Field Marshal Fedor von Bock. His official role was to train Russian propagandists for the German military. His personal goal, in the special camp he established at Dabendorf near Berlin, to form a resistance army.[11]

Soviet countermeasures

Even though the Soviets did not do well in preventing the formation of the RLA, they had significant intelligence penetration of German-sponsored resistance movements. Boris Miklashevsky was a former boxing champion and clandestine intelligence officer, resident in Berlin between 1941 and 1944. After the war's end, he was assigned to hunting down RLA forces; he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and returned to boxing in 1947.[12]

Declared foundation of the Russian liberation movement: Proponent angle

An opportunity to achieve this goal was presented with the German invasion. In June 1942, leaflets encouraging Soviet soldiers to lay down their arms and welcome Adolf Hitler as the liberator were dropped at the front and in the areas being occupied. As a counter-move, the Soviet leadership attempted to paint a picture of the German as an evil enemy – the Germans, who were allies a short time ago. As Soviet citizens were accustomed to reading between the lines in the official statements, this campaign made little impression on the population. Part of the Soviet soldiers and civilians had had contact with Germans in the 1st World War and could not match their personal impression with the one offered in official publications.

Also, this alliance gone sour produced another alliance with the former (and later) arch enemies Great Britain and USA. This strengthened the impression that the priorities of the Soviet leadership were not in reality what they were officially.

And so, there was an interest in an alliance with the German state. This because it was impossible to imagine that it could be the intention of German leadership to conquer and continually occupy all of the Soviet Union, due to its massive size – not to mention the experience with the Russian geography done by Napoleon. Ergo, it would be in the interest of Nazi Germany to cooperate with a group interested in creating an alliance, in which the Soviet Union – or Russia, depending on which interest group was consulted – would exist as a democratic republic – or, as some suggested, a monarchy again – which would be a supportive military and trade ally of Germany.

Germany was seen as a nation with positive associations, because it was part of a European traditionally shared cultural community. It also had a certain effect that it was a practising Christian society, as opposed to the Soviet Union, in which the state had made a substantial and rather heavy-handed effort to eliminate religious practice.

After the defeat of his 2nd Shock Army in the summer of 1942, Vlasov was captured by German forces.

While working on this, he stresses some good things with the Soviet system as opposed to Imperial Russia, but he also stresses that which is unacceptable in the new system – that the system is not, what it is pretending to be.

The German army responded positively to the idea, but postponed taking full advantage of it due to the scepticism of the political leadership, based on ideological issues. Vlasov was allowed to travel to POW camps and occupied areas, where he presented his cause – which was popular, and the soldiers already active in the Wehrmacht, albeit not as part of a common coordinated force, started wearing the ROA insignia, as they saw themselves as part of a shared cause – a liberation army.

He was captured on the way to the American sector, where he was found to be in possession of a large amount of money. This is interpreted as meaning that he had gained what he could and was searching for a new winning master – yet another capitalist state, which the USSR had allied with temporarily, but which should be treated with caution.

The Soviet official position: Critical angle

A minor group of Soviet citizens cooperated with the German occupation force. The collaborators were either former prisoners of war or soldiers and civilians, who changed sides during the war.

Having surrendered to the invaders, the prisoners of war were already counted as traitors by Soviet definition, as these were considered people, who were not willing to make an effort and sacrifice to defend their country – who had let themselves get surrounded on the battlefield and taken the easy way out by surrendering instead of fighting to the end. Volunteering for the liberation movement after capture demonstrates their weakness, either by making the choice based on threats of physical abuse, or allowing themselves to be bribed with pay, food and relative freedom.

The soldiers and civilians, who changed sides, were perceived as cowards and opportunists in the same fashion, as people willing to sacrifice the future of their homeland to be on the (apparently) winning side, where it was possible to gain something for oneself. It was seen as typical for the kind of people who are weak and deceitful by nature – or as a variation of this, people who had lost land, fortune and privileges with the people's revolution, well-off families and large-scale farmers (kulaki), who had no interest in the preservation of the Soviet system.

During the final trial in 1946, he admitted to having lost heart, that he was offended by his country, and admitted to his treason. So, when he and his inner circle were hanged, they got the punishment which was to be expected and deserved for traitors of such a caliber.

References

  1. Bob E. Willis Jr. (Academic Year 2004-2005), After the Blitzkrieg: The German Army’s Transition to Defeat in the East, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, p. 27
  2. A Soviet lieutenant general is equivalent to a two-star Western major general
  3. General Vlasov's Last Hours, Radio Free Europe Research, 27 April 1973
  4. Catherine Andreyev (1987), Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement: Soviet Reality and Emigré Theories, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 9780521389600, p. 3
  5. Andreyev, p. 10
  6. Andreyev, pp. 19-21
  7. A.V. Tishkov: "Predatel' pered sovetskim sudom" in Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo" No. 2/1973, cited by RFE
  8. Leonid Grenkevich (1999), The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1944, Frank Cass and Company, p. 9, cited by Willis
  9. Willis, p. 43
  10. Wilfried Strik-Strikfeldt (1970), Against Stalin and Hitler: Memoir of the Russian Liberation Movement, 1941-1945, Macmillan
  11. Willis, pp. 40-41
  12. Pavel Sudoplatov; Anatoli Sudoplatov, Jerrold L. Schecter, Leona P. Schecter (1994). Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet Spymaster. Little, Brown and Company. ISBN 0316773522. , pp. 115-116