No-fly zone

A no-fly zone increasingly is a tool of grand strategy, imprecisely defined term in international law. Loosely, it is a politcomilitary operation analogous to a naval blockade, but focused on airspace rather than areas at sea. Well-known examples include those over northern and southern Iraq between the Gulf War and Iraq War, and over Kosovo. There have been proposals for making such a zone over Darfur, and, in March 2011, there are suggestions about implementing one over Libya.

Effective air blockades are far more complex to implement than news media may suggest. Implementing them takes several kinds of aircraft: air superiority fighters, electronic and kinetic attack aircraft for suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), and command, control, communications and intelligence aircraft. All these aircraft will require huge amounts of fuel, and substantial spare parts and maintenance personnel -- many modern aircraft need tens of hours of maintenance for every hour they fly. Bases are needed both for the actual aircraft and for their control and coordination. In practice, there usually must be decent transportation from seaport(s) to the operating locations.

They also present many forms of political risk. While the Balkans operations, such as Operation DENY FLIGHT, were among the more successful in achieving goals, they ended with strategic strikes, Operation ALLIED FORCE, on critical targets not associated with air operations. After many years, the no-fly zones over Iraq were problems for Saddam Hussein, but not decisive -- and there was no short-of-war clear exit strategy once they were begun.

Other political costs can involve losses of pilots and equipment. Use of unmanned aerial vehicles reduces that risk, and the general technological superiority of the blockading force often dominates. Nevertheless, no plan survives contact with the enemy; even a radar-evading stealthy F-117 Nighthawk was shot down over Yugoslavia, although the pilot was recovered. Avoiding losses is one reason that a no-fly campaign usually begins with a strong SEAD campaign, and the rules of engagement often permit immediate action against ground-based air defense in the zone.

Initial phases

If the no-fly zone is in range of aircraft carriers, initial patrols can come from there, but sustainable operations probably need major land bases with good transportation to them. This, for example, temds to rule out a no-fly zone for Darfur, since Chad, with little infrastructure and poor security, is the plausible base location.

Intelligence activities are needed to locate the regular bases and potential hiding areas for enemy aircraft and support facilities. It is rather standard doctrine to do extensive communications intelligence analysis to learn the patterns by which the opposing force operates, especially if they are allowed to fly in some areas but not others -- communications intelligence, along with radar surveillance, can warn when aircraft aloft are moving toward a probibited zones.

Intelligence aircraft, ground sensors, and personnel need logistic support.

Logistics usually requires a significant amount of air refueling. During Operation ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo, over 78 days of combat operations, tankers flew five thousand sorties to enable nearly 24,000 combat and combat-support sorties. Since the tankers are large aircraft that may not be able to use the same bases as fighters, it was necessary to stage tankers from bases as far away as France and Hungary.

Operational experience

Serbia and Kosovo

A series of NATO operations, of increasing intensity, preceded the major air strikes.

Operation SKY MONITOR

From 15 October 1992 to 12 April 1993, NATO aircraft observed the No-Fly Zone declared by the United Nations Security Council against flights by military aircraft of the warring factions over Bosnia during the fighting in Former Yugoslavia. This operation was followed by the enforcement operation known as DENY FLIGHT.

Operation DENY FLIGHT

Betwern 12 April 1993 amd 21 December 1995, NATO aircraft enforced the UN Security Council’s No-Fly Zone over Bosnia. Subsequent additions to Operation DENY FLIGHT included Close Air Support to UN peacekeepers and air strikes in support of UN resolutions. On 28 February 1994 NATO engaged in the first combat operations in its history when DENY FLIGHT aircraft shot down four Bosnian Serb fighter-bombers conducting a bombing mission in violation of the No-Fly Zone.

Operation DEADEYE

After a mortar attack caused heavy loss of life at a marketplace in Sarajevo, UN peacekeepers requested NATO airstrikes, in the form of suppression of enemy air defense operations that began on 30 August against Bosnian Serb air defences (Operation DEADEYE) and lasted through the night.

Operation DELIBERATE FORCE

When a bombing pause failed to result in Bosnian Serb compliance with the UN’s demands to withdraw, Operation DELIBERATE FORCE targeted Bosnian Serb command & control installations and ammunition facilities, in operations from 5 - 14 September 1995. These airstrikes were a key factor in bringing the Serbs to the negotiating table and ending the war in Bosnia.

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR

Air support was part of NATO’s first peace enforcement operation, conducted between , 20 December 1995 - 20 December 1996. The Implementation Force (IFOR) – which had the mission of implementing the military aspects of the peace agreement for Bosnia (separation of warring factions and creating safe and secure conditions for the other tasks associated with the peace agreement). Approximately 60,000 troops from the 16 NATO members and 17 non-NATO countries including Russia participated in IFOR initially.

Operation JOINT GUARD

20 December 1996 - 20 June 1998 Following the end of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR and the completion of the initial military tasks for implementing the peace agreement, NATO continued leading the international peacekeeping operation in Bosnia with a new focus and a smaller force now bearing the name Stabilisation Force (SFOR) instead of Implementation Force (IFOR).

Operation JOINT FORGE

20 June 1998 - 2 December 2004 After the situation in Bosnia continued to improve, requiring fewer peacekeepers, and the Bosnian state acquired increased sovereignty including control of its airspace, NATO again reduced the size of the SFOR (Stabilisation Force) peacekeeping operation and made changes to the mission, which finally ended on 2 December 2004 when a European Union-led force (EUFOR; the operation was named ALTHEA) took over.

Operation EAGLE EYE

30 October 1998 - 24 March 1999 At the request of the United Nations Security Council, NATO aircraft conducted aerial monitoring of the situation in Kosovo to verify Serb compliance with UN resolutions regarding a ceasefire and with NATO-Serb agreements regarding force reductions in Kosovo. The Serbs did not comply with these resolutions and agreements, and Operation EAGLE EYE ended when the Kosovo Conflict began.

Operation JOINT GUARANTOR

4 December 1998 - 20 March 1999 NATO prepared plans and made preparations for the evacuation of OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) monitors in Kosovo, which did not prove necessary. The OSCE’s Kosovo Verification Mission was expelled from Kosovo by the Serbs on 20 Mar 1999, four days before the start of the Kosovo Conflict.