No-fly zone: Difference between revisions

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A '''no-fly zone''' increasingly is a tool of [[grand strategy]], imprecisely defined term in [[international law]].  Loosely, it is a [[politicomilitary doctrine|politcomilitary operation]] analogous to a [[naval blockade]], but focused on airspace rather than areas at sea.  Well-known examples include those over northern and southern Iraq between the [[Gulf War]] and [[Iraq War]], and over [[Kosovo]]. There have been proposals for making such a zone over [[Darfur Conflict|Darfur]], and, in March 2011, there are suggestions about implementing one over [[Libya]].
A '''no-fly zone''' increasingly is a tool of [[grand strategy]], imprecisely defined term in [[international law]].  Loosely, it is a [[politicomilitary doctrine|politcomilitary operation]] analogous to a [[naval blockade]], but focused on airspace rather than areas at sea.  Well-known examples include those over northern and southern Iraq between the [[Gulf War]] and [[Iraq War]], and over [[Kosovo]]. There have been proposals for making such a zone over [[Darfur Conflict|Darfur]], and, in March 2011, there are suggestions about implementing one over [[Libya]].


Effective air blockades are far more complex to implement than news media may suggest.  Implementing them takes several kinds of aircraft: air superiority fighters, electronic and kinetic attack aircraft for [[suppression of enemy air defense]], and [[C3I-ISR|command, control, communications and intelligence]] aircraft.  All these aircraft will require huge amounts of fuel,  and substantial spare parts and maintenance personnel -- many modern aircraft need tens of hours of maintenance for every hour they fly.  Bases are needed both for the actual aircraft and for their control and coordination. In practice, there usually must be decent transportation from seaport(s) to the operating locations.
Effective air blockades are far more complex to implement than news media may suggest.  Implementing them takes several kinds of aircraft: air superiority fighters, electronic and kinetic attack aircraft for [[suppression of enemy air defense]] (SEAD), and [[C3I-ISR|command, control, communications and intelligence]] aircraft.  All these aircraft will require huge amounts of fuel,  and substantial spare parts and maintenance personnel -- many modern aircraft need tens of hours of maintenance for every hour they fly.  Bases are needed both for the actual aircraft and for their control and coordination. In practice, there usually must be decent transportation from seaport(s) to the operating locations.
 
They also present many forms of political risk. While the Kosovo operation, [[Operation ALLIED FORCE]], was one of the more successful in achieving goals, it was also coupled with strategic strikes on critical targets not associated with air operations. After many years, the no-fly zones over Iraq were problems for Saddam Hussein, but not decisive -- and there was no short-of-war clear exit strategy once they were begun.
 
Other political costs can involve losses of pilots and equipment. Use of [[unmanned aerial vehicle]]s reduces that risk, and the general technological superiority of the blockading force often dominates. Nevertheless, no plan survives contact with the enemy; even a radar-evading stealthy [[F-117 Nighthawk]] was shot down over Yugoslavia, although the pilot was recovered.  Avoiding losses is one reason that a no-fly campaign usually begins with a strong SEAD campaign, and the rules of engagement often permit immediate action against ground-based air defense in the zone.


==Initial phases==
==Initial phases==
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Intelligence aircraft, ground sensors, and personnel need logistic support.
Intelligence aircraft, ground sensors, and personnel need logistic support.
Logistics usually requires a significant amount of [[air refueling]]. During [[Operation ALLIED FORCE]] in Kosovo, over 78 days of combat operations, tankers flew five thousand [[sortie]]s to enable nearly 24,000 combat and combat-support sorties.  Since the tankers are large aircraft that may not be able to use the same bases as fighters, it was necessary to stage tankers from bases as far away as France and Hungary. <ref>{{citation
| url = http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj99/win99/begert.htm
| journal = Aerospace Power Journal | date =  Winter 1999
| title = Kosovo and Theater Air Mobility
| author = William J. Begert}}</ref>
==Suppression of enemy air defense==
==Suppression of enemy air defense==
==Offensive counter-air==
==Offensive counter-air==
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===Darfur===
===Darfur===
===Libya===
===Libya===
==References==
{{reflist}}

Revision as of 11:08, 4 March 2011

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A no-fly zone increasingly is a tool of grand strategy, imprecisely defined term in international law. Loosely, it is a politcomilitary operation analogous to a naval blockade, but focused on airspace rather than areas at sea. Well-known examples include those over northern and southern Iraq between the Gulf War and Iraq War, and over Kosovo. There have been proposals for making such a zone over Darfur, and, in March 2011, there are suggestions about implementing one over Libya.

Effective air blockades are far more complex to implement than news media may suggest. Implementing them takes several kinds of aircraft: air superiority fighters, electronic and kinetic attack aircraft for suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), and command, control, communications and intelligence aircraft. All these aircraft will require huge amounts of fuel, and substantial spare parts and maintenance personnel -- many modern aircraft need tens of hours of maintenance for every hour they fly. Bases are needed both for the actual aircraft and for their control and coordination. In practice, there usually must be decent transportation from seaport(s) to the operating locations.

They also present many forms of political risk. While the Kosovo operation, Operation ALLIED FORCE, was one of the more successful in achieving goals, it was also coupled with strategic strikes on critical targets not associated with air operations. After many years, the no-fly zones over Iraq were problems for Saddam Hussein, but not decisive -- and there was no short-of-war clear exit strategy once they were begun.

Other political costs can involve losses of pilots and equipment. Use of unmanned aerial vehicles reduces that risk, and the general technological superiority of the blockading force often dominates. Nevertheless, no plan survives contact with the enemy; even a radar-evading stealthy F-117 Nighthawk was shot down over Yugoslavia, although the pilot was recovered. Avoiding losses is one reason that a no-fly campaign usually begins with a strong SEAD campaign, and the rules of engagement often permit immediate action against ground-based air defense in the zone.

Initial phases

Intelligence activities are needed to locate the regular bases and potential hiding areas for enemy aircraft and support facilities. It is rather standard doctrine to do extensive communications intelligence analysis to learn the patterns by which the opposing force operates, especially if they are allowed to fly in some areas but not others -- communications intelligence, along with radar surveillance, can warn when aircraft aloft are moving toward a probibited zones.

Intelligence aircraft, ground sensors, and personnel need logistic support.

Logistics usually requires a significant amount of air refueling. During Operation ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo, over 78 days of combat operations, tankers flew five thousand sorties to enable nearly 24,000 combat and combat-support sorties. Since the tankers are large aircraft that may not be able to use the same bases as fighters, it was necessary to stage tankers from bases as far away as France and Hungary. [1]

Suppression of enemy air defense

Offensive counter-air

Patrol and interception

Operational experience

Potential operations

Darfur

Libya

References

  1. William J. Begert (Winter 1999), "Kosovo and Theater Air Mobility", Aerospace Power Journal