Gulf of Tonkin incident

The Gulf of Tonkin incident, in August 1964, was the event that led President Lyndon B. Johnson to order air attacks on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and vastly intensify U.S. forces in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). Two incidents were described to the Congress, one on the lone destroyer USS Maddox, and the second, on the night of August 4, on the Maddox and the USS C. Turner Joy, which had been sent to reinforce the Maddox. The destroyer patrol also had on-call air support.

In response to a presumed attack, the President requested and received the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorizing miliary response. While it was claimed that North Vietnamese patrol boats had attacked U.S. warships in the Gulf, there is considerable data, especially recently declassified signals intelligence from the National Security Agency that indicates that there was no second attack..

Prior to the incidents with the destroyers, under the then-classified United States Pacific Command(CINCPAC) Operations Plan (OPPLAN 34A), there had been a series of covert U.S.-RVN attacks on DRV coastal boats and shore installations, carried out by MACV-SOG. The Maddox was conducting a DESOTO PATROL, an operation with two purposes. Its public purpose was to demonstrate that the U.S. did not agree with the 12-mile limit of territorial waters claimed by the DRV. In addition, it had a signals intelligence mission, with intercept equipment and technicians in a van strapped to a destroyer's deck. The SIGINT mission of the Maddox was to record the North Vietnamese signals being generated after the alert from the 34A operation.

The basic assumption of the incident were that North Vietnamese naval vessels of a fast attack craft type, had attacked U.S. destroyers, in international waters of the Gulf of Tonkin, on the nights of August 2 and August 4th. On August 5th, President Johnson ordered retaliatory airstrikes on North Vietnamese bases associated with the vessels in question.

While there still are inconsistencies, it is likely that fire was exchanged on August 2, between North Vietnamese fast attack craft and the Sumner-class destroyer USS Maddox on August 2, although it is unclear which side shot first. There is a good deal more question about the August 4 incident, involving of Maddox and Forrest Sherman-class destroyer USS C. Turner Joy.

The President authorized the initial retaliatory strikes on his own authority, and then went to the Congress and received the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. A number of facts, and some matters of interpretation, were not available to the Congress or the public at the time. There are also some matters that remain uncertain, including North Vietnamese thinking.

1. There had been MACV-SOG naval raids against North Vietnam as recently as July 30, which were within its territorial limits and included attacks on land. While these raids were not conducted by overt warships, did the North Vietnamese believe the close-in warship, on August 2, was to be part of another attack?
2. Close-in destroyer patrols, originally targeted against Communist China, were not freedom of navigation exercises alone; destroyers assigned to Operation DESOTO had national-level signals intelligence equipment and technicians, in a temporarily mounted on-deck van, operating under direction of the National Security Agency
3. North Vietnam was added to the DESOTO targeting in December 1962, so their appearance was not new to the North Vietnamese, and considerably preceded the creation of MACV-SOG
4. The North Vietnamese were said to have fired first, but the captain of the Maddox, in a report released at the time, said he fired warning shots
5. The attacks were described as including torpedoes
6. North Vietnamese fast attack craft reported in the incident are generally identified as Swatow-class, which are not equipped with torpedoes

The U.S. had planned escalation against North Vietnam. This was the ostensible trigger, although it probably involved the "fog of war" on both sides. "The U.S. reprisal represented the carrying out of recommendations made to the President by his principal advisers earlier that summer and subsequently placed on the shelf."

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

Congress passes a joint resolution stating that international peace and security in SEA were "vital to" the national interest. The resolution authorized President Johnson "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force," to assist any SEATO "member of protocol state" requesting US help in defending its freedom. (Dept. of State Bulletin August 24, 1964) 14 Aug 1964

Actions in the aftermath of the Resolution

Department of State cables Saigon and Vietnam embassies and CINCPAC requesting comment on key points in a "tentative high level paper on next courses of action in SEA." In summary of points, is included statement, "the next ten days to two weeks should be short holding phase in which we would avoid action that would in any way take onus off Communist side for escalation." Cable then specifies that DESOTO patrol will not be resumed and new 34A operations will not be undertaken. After sketching "essential elements of the political and military situations in both SVN and Laos, as well as respective strategies re negotiations, the cable then lists proposed "limited pressures" to be exerted on the DRV in Laos and in NVN during the period, "late August tentatively through December." (State Msgs. to Saigon 439; Vietnam 157)

10 Sep 1964

President authorizes resumption of DESOTO patrols and MAROPS portion of the 34A operations.

18 Sep 1964

President suspends DESOTO patrol operation, in the wake of a third incident (18 Sep 64) involving NVN patrol boat threats to US destroyer in the Tonkin Gulf.

3 Oct 1964

President Johnson authorizes resumption of the MAROPS program, involving (during October) two probes, an attempted junk capture and ship-to-shore bombardment of radar sites.

Prior covert operations

On 9 September 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved CINCPAC OPLAN 34-63, which called for MACV and the Central Intelligence Agency (known as CAS), Saigon to provide advice and assistance to the GVN in certain operations against NVN. Phase I of the plan was to consist of "Psychological Operations"; Phase II of "Hit and Run Attacks." The latter included "amphibious raids using Vietnamese UDT/SEAL Team, Rangers, Airborne, and Marine units against selected targets south of the Tonkin Delta having little or no security." Apparently, the plan was not forwarded to the White House by SecDef.

While the attacks on the DESOTO patrols were explained as attacks on vessels carrying out free passage, and had not provoked the DRV other than to sail inside its claimed 12 mile limit (the US respected a tradional 3 mile limit, "In fact the United States at the time was carrying out a program of covert naval commando attacks against North Vietnam and had been engaged in this effort since its approval by Johnson in January 1964." The NSA report also said the Maddox had first fired warning shots.

DESOTO patrols and naval response

There almost certainly was a North Vietnamese attack, on August 2, on the single-destroyer DESOTO patrol being conducted by the USS Maddox'. It is still unclear if the attack was meant as retaliation for the prior 34A raid, or if they regarded the Maddox as a potential attacker, or simply wanted to increase pressure on the U.S. In any event, the President ordered a second destroyer, the USS C. Turner Joy, to join the Maddox.

34-A forces carried out another raid on North Vietnam during the night of August 3/4, when the U.S. destroyers were beginning their run back up the Tonkin Gulf. If Hanoi was responding to the first raid, a second one furnished an equivalent reason to act against the reinforced DeSoto Patrol.

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara discussed, with the President. how the two alleged attacks were to be explained to the Congress.

Secretary McNamara: Right. And we're going to, and I think I should also, or we should also at that time, Mr. President, explain this Op Plan 34-A, these covert operations. There's no question but what that had bearing on. And on Friday night, as you probably know, we had four TP [McNamara means PT] boats from Vietnam manned by Vietnamese or other nationals, attack two is lands. And we expended, oh, a thousand rounds of ammunition of one kind or another against them. We probably shot up a radar station and a few other miscellaneous buildings. And following twenty-four hours after that, with this destroyer in that same area, undoubtedly led them to connect the two events.

Retaliatory airstrikes

Operating on his authority as Commander-in-Chief, Johnson had retaliatory strikes launched against the DRV. Whether it was his lack of military experience and his unwillingness to listen to military advisors, or that his concern for domestic politics overrode tactical considerations, he went on national television to announce the airstrikes, while some of them were still inbound to their targets — which could have been alerted by his broadcast. According to H.R. McMaster, Johnson would not delay his television broadcast because he wanted it to be sure to make the late evening news, and the deadlines for morning newspapers.

Gulf of Tonkin resolution

On August 7, President Johnson addressed the Congress, and asked for and received an authorization for military force against the DRV -- not a formal declaration of war -- which was granted. was addressed by Lyndon B. Johnson as a joint resolution of the U.S. Congress passed on 7 August 1964. House Joint Resolution was framed as an authorization to provide military assistance to any member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) (see SEATO and South Vietnam. South Vietnam was not a SEATO member, but was covered by a bilateral agreemet with the United States.