Talk:Mind: Difference between revisions
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# <!--Get decision-quotes from Gazzaniga's <i>Who's In Charge</i> (kndl)--> | # <!--Get decision-quotes from Gazzaniga's <i>Who's In Charge</i> (kndl)--> [[User:Anthony.Sebastian|Anthony.Sebastian]] 20:37, 25 August 2012 (UTC) |
Latest revision as of 14:37, 25 August 2012
Start of article Mind
Starting article, as stub, from lemma, after editing definition. —Anthony.Sebastian 16:37, 6 January 2011 (UTC)
- Brave, brave person.Gareth Leng 16:56, 6 January 2011 (UTC)
- “Bravery is being the only one who knows you're afraid.” Franklin P. Jones (1887-1929) —Anthony.Sebastian 05:09, 7 January 2011 (UTC)
“The essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the observation of particular effects, which result from different circumstances and situations.” David Hume, quoted here.Gareth Leng 13:25, 11 January 2011 (UTC)
- Gareth, thanks for the quote, for directing me to SEP's 'David Hume' article, and the gentle hint to move on to the science of mind. Trying to work out an original organizational scheme for the body of the article. Thinking about the possibility of working backward in time, but seeing the problems there. Any thoughts? —Anthony.Sebastian 23:14, 11 January 2011 (UTC)
I went to a lecture by Daniel Dennett just before Christmas, - a bit disappointing. He approached the problem of free will by looking at Benjamin Libet's experiments; his theme was that neuroscientists can't do philosophy, and I think he showe pretty convincingly that philosophers can't do neuroscience. Anyway I was looking forward with interest to seeing how you'd approach it. The Libet experiments are (very)limited but interesting in that they attempt to make concrete and testable predictions about the nature of awareness. Some of his experimental outcomes are consistent with the idea that, for some tasks at least, our brain makes a decision before we have any awareness of doing so - with the implication that our cognitive processes are more rationalisations than deliberations, and raising questions about the nature of free will (i.e. how can we be punished for the "conscious" intent behind a deed, if the conscious "intent" was not in fact part of the determining events that led to the deed, but a mere rationalisation of a decision that itself was outside conscious control). Gareth Leng 16:39, 12 January 2011 (UTC)
- Might want to take a look at William Cullen, along with
Thomas Reid and
Dugald Stewart - I've been meaning to write an article on Dugald Stewart.Gareth Leng 12:52, 15 January 2011 (UTC)
Mind these
- Anthony.Sebastian 20:37, 25 August 2012 (UTC)