Superior orders: Difference between revisions
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As a legal defense against [[war crime]] charges, the doctrine of '''superior orders''' holds that an individual cannot be held responsible for actions that were ordered by a superior officer. The doctrine was generally rejected by the [[Nuremberg Trials]], but has been challenged since. | |||
Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter states " "The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to an order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment, if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires."<ref>{{citation | |||
| title = Alternatives to Obeying Superior Orders; A Question for the International Criminal Court | |||
| author = Rajeev Purohit | url = http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v5i1/html/supord.html | |||
}}</ref> | |||
In the statute authorizing the [[International Criminal Court]], Article 33 reads : | |||
*1 The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless : | |||
**(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or the superior in question ; | |||
**(b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful ; and | |||
**(c) The order was not manifestly unlawful. | |||
*2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful.”<ref>{{citation | |||
| title = Superior orders and the International Criminal Court: Justice delivered or justice denied | |||
| date = 31 December 1999 | |||
| journal = International Review of the Red Cross | author = Charles Garraway | |||
| url = http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jq7h.htm | |||
}}</ref> | |||
==References== | |||
{{reflist}} | |||
Revision as of 17:28, 10 December 2010
As a legal defense against war crime charges, the doctrine of superior orders holds that an individual cannot be held responsible for actions that were ordered by a superior officer. The doctrine was generally rejected by the Nuremberg Trials, but has been challenged since.
Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter states " "The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to an order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment, if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires."[1]
In the statute authorizing the International Criminal Court, Article 33 reads :
- 1 The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless :
- (a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or the superior in question ;
- (b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful ; and
- (c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.
- 2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful.”[2]
References
- ↑ Rajeev Purohit, Alternatives to Obeying Superior Orders; A Question for the International Criminal Court
- ↑ Charles Garraway (31 December 1999), "Superior orders and the International Criminal Court: Justice delivered or justice denied", International Review of the Red Cross