Pseudoscience: Difference between revisions

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==Defining science by the scientific method==
==Defining science by the scientific method==
In the mid-20th Century, [[Karl Popper]] suggested the criterion of [[falsifiability]] to distinguish science from non-science.<ref>Popper, KR (1959) "The Logic of Scientific Discovery" (English translation, 1959)[http://www.routledge.com/popper/works/logic_discovery.html].</ref> Theories such as God created the universe may be true or false, but they are not falsifiable, so they are not scientific; they lie outside the scope of science. Popper subdivided non-science into philosophical, mathematical, mythological, religious and/or metaphysical formulations on the one hand, and pseudoscientific formulations on the other &mdash; though without providing clear criteria for the differences.<ref>Popper KR "Science: Conjectures and Refutations"</ref> He gave astrology, Marxism, and Freudian psychoanalysis as examples of pseudosciences in being wholly unfalsifiable.<ref>Popper KR (1962) [http://karws.gso.uri.edu/JFK/critical_thinking/Science_pseudo_falsifiability.html Science, Pseudo-Science, and Falsifiability]. ''Conjectures and Refutations''</ref>  More recently, [[Paul Thagard]] proposed that pseudoscience can be distinguishable from science by its lack of progress, and by the lack of serious attempts by proponents to solve problems with the theory. [[Mario Bunge]] has suggested the categories of "belief fields" and "research fields" to help distinguish between science and pseudoscience.
In the mid-20th Century, [[Karl Popper]] suggested the criterion of [[falsifiability]] to distinguish science from non-science.<ref>Popper, KR (1959) "The Logic of Scientific Discovery" (English translation, 1959)[http://www.routledge.com/popper/works/logic_discovery.html].</ref> Theories such as God created the universe may be true or false, but they are not falsifiable, so they are not scientific; they lie outside the scope of science. Popper subdivided non-science into philosophical, mathematical, mythological, religious and/or metaphysical formulations on the one hand, and pseudoscientific formulations on the other &mdash; though without providing clear criteria for the differences.<ref>Popper KR "Science: Conjectures and Refutations"</ref> He gave astrology, Marxism, and Freudian psychoanalysis as examples of pseudosciences in being wholly unfalsifiable.<ref>Popper KR (1962) [http://karws.gso.uri.edu/JFK/critical_thinking/Science_pseudo_falsifiability.html Science, Pseudo-Science, and Falsifiability]. ''Conjectures and Refutations''</ref>  More recently, [[Paul Thagard]] proposed that pseudoscience can be distinguishable from science by its lack of progress, and by the lack of serious attempts by proponents to solve problems with the theory. [[Mario Bunge]] has suggested the categories of "belief fields" and "research fields" to help distinguish between science and pseudoscience.
Among the issues which can make the distinction difficult are that both the theories and methodologies of science evolve at differing rates in response to new data.<ref>Thagard PR (1978) "Why astrology is a pseudoscience" (1978) In PSA 1978, Volume 1, ed. Asquith PD and Hacking I (East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1978) 223 ff. Thagard writes, at 227, 228: "We can now propose the following principle of demarcation: A theory or discipline which purports to be scientific is pseudoscientific if and only if: it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces many unsolved problems; but the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations."</ref> In addition, the standards applicable to one field of science may not be those used in other fields.


The [[brights movement]], prominently represented by [[Richard Dawkins]], [[Mario Bunge]], [[Carl Sagan]] and [[James Randi]], consider all forms of pseudoscience to be harmful, whether or not they result in immediate harm to their adherents. These critics consider that pseudoscientific beliefs may be held for several reasons, from simple naïveté about the nature of science, to deception for financial or political gain. At the extreme, issues of personal health and safety may be involved, for example in the case of physical or mental therapy, or in assessing safety risks.
The [[brights movement]], prominently represented by [[Richard Dawkins]], [[Mario Bunge]], [[Carl Sagan]] and [[James Randi]], consider all forms of pseudoscience to be harmful, whether or not they result in immediate harm to their adherents. These critics consider that pseudoscientific beliefs may be held for several reasons, from simple naïveté about the nature of science, to deception for financial or political gain. At the extreme, issues of personal health and safety may be involved, for example in the case of physical or mental therapy, or in assessing safety risks.

Revision as of 07:54, 1 November 2006


Phrenology is regarded today as a classic example of pseudoscience.

The term pseudoscience which combines the Greek root pseudo, meaning false, and the Latin scientia, meaning knowledge, appears to have been used first in 1843 by Magendie, who referred to phrenology as "a pseudo-science of the present day" [1] Among its early uses was in 1844 in the Northern Journal of Medicine, I 387: "That opposite kind of innovation which pronounces what has been recognized as a branch of science, to have been a pseudo-science, composed merely of so-called facts, connected together by misapprehensions under the disguise of principles".


Introduction

The conventions for determining whether a body of knowledge, methodology, or practice is "scientific" vary from field to field, but generally involve similar principles of reproducibility and intersubjective verifiability. [2] Such principles aim to ensure that evidence can be replicated, which allows further investigation to determine whether a hypothesis or theory is valid and reliable. Validated methods are expected to be applied consistently, and bias to be controlled or eliminated. Data, including experimental/environmental conditions, are expected to be documented for scrutiny and made available for peer review.

However, despite general agreement on these principles, there is disagreement about whether it is possible to distinguish "science" from "pseudoscience" in a reliable and objective way, and about whether attempting to do so is useful. The philosopher of science Paul Feyeraband in particular is associated with the view that attempts to distinguish science from non-science are flawed. "The idea that science can, and should, be run according to fixed and universal rules, is both unrealistic and pernicious. ... the idea is detrimental to science, for it neglects the complex physical and historical conditions which influence scientific change. It makes our science less adaptable and more dogmatic:"[3] [4]

Those who believe that characterising some areas as pseudoscientific is useful stress the use of vague, exaggerated or untestable claims, over-reliance on confirmation rather than refutation, lack of openness to testing by other experts, and a lack of progress in theory development. The term "pseudoscientific" is sometimes applied by disputants working in the same field to disparage a competing theory or the argument used by a rival, sometimes by commentators from outside a field to disparage a whole field, sometimes to express the opinion that a theory published in a popular book has no academic credibility [5] and sometimes in reference to a theory now discarded. [6]

Defining science by the scientific method

In the mid-20th Century, Karl Popper suggested the criterion of falsifiability to distinguish science from non-science.[7] Theories such as God created the universe may be true or false, but they are not falsifiable, so they are not scientific; they lie outside the scope of science. Popper subdivided non-science into philosophical, mathematical, mythological, religious and/or metaphysical formulations on the one hand, and pseudoscientific formulations on the other — though without providing clear criteria for the differences.[8] He gave astrology, Marxism, and Freudian psychoanalysis as examples of pseudosciences in being wholly unfalsifiable.[9] More recently, Paul Thagard proposed that pseudoscience can be distinguishable from science by its lack of progress, and by the lack of serious attempts by proponents to solve problems with the theory. Mario Bunge has suggested the categories of "belief fields" and "research fields" to help distinguish between science and pseudoscience.

The brights movement, prominently represented by Richard Dawkins, Mario Bunge, Carl Sagan and James Randi, consider all forms of pseudoscience to be harmful, whether or not they result in immediate harm to their adherents. These critics consider that pseudoscientific beliefs may be held for several reasons, from simple naïveté about the nature of science, to deception for financial or political gain. At the extreme, issues of personal health and safety may be involved, for example in the case of physical or mental therapy, or in assessing safety risks.

Identifying pseudoscience

Science differs from revelation, theology, or spirituality in that it claims to offer insight into the physical world by "scientific" means. Systems of thought that derive from "divine" or "inspired" knowledge are not considered pseudoscience if they do not claim to be scientific. However, a field might plausibly be called pseudoscientific if it is presented as consistent with the accepted norms of scientific research, but demonstrably fails to meet these norms.[10]

The following have been proposed to be indicative of poor scientific reasoning.

  • Vague, exaggerated or untestable claims
  • Failure to use "operational definitions" (i.e. a rigorous description of the means by which measurements are made).
  • Failure to use the principle of parsimony, i.e. failing to seek an explanation that requires the fewest possible additional assumptions when other viable explanations are possible (Occam's Razor)
  • Use of obscurantist language, and misuse of apparently technical jargon, in an effort to give claims the superficial trappings of science.
  • Lack of boundary conditions: Most well-supported scientific theories possess well articulated limitations under which predictions do or do not apply.
  • Assertion of scientific claims that cannot be falsified in the event they are incorrect, inaccurate, or irrelevant [11]
  • Assertion of claims that a theory predicts something that it has not been shown to predict [12]
  • Assertion that claims which have not been proven false must be true, and vice versa (see: Argument from ignorance)[13]
  • Over-reliance on testimonials and anecdotes. Testimonial and anecdotal evidence can be useful for discovery (hypothesis generation) but should not be used in the context of justification (hypothesis testing). [14]
  • Selective use of experimental evidence: presenting data that seem to support claims while suppressing or refusing to consider data that conflict with those claims.
  • Reversed burden of proof. In science, the burden of proof rests on the individual making a claim, not on the critic. "Pseudoscientific" arguments may neglect this principle and demand that skeptics demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that a claim is false. As it is essentially impossible to prove a universal negative, this tactic incorrectly places the burden of proof on the skeptic rather than the claimant.
  • Evasion of peer review before publicizing results ("science by press conference"). [15]

Some proponents of theories that contradict accepted scientific theories avoid the often ego-bruising process of peer review, sometimes on the grounds that peer review is biased against claims that contradict established paradigms, and sometimes on the grounds that assertions cannot be evaluated using standard scientific methods. [16]

  • Failure to provide adequate information for other researchers to reproduce claimed results.
  • Assertion of claims of secrecy or proprietary knowledge in response to requests for review of data or methodology.

Lack of progress

  • Thagard [17] proposed that a theory or discipline which has pretensions to be scientific can be regarded as pseudoscientific "if and only if: it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces many unsolved problems; but the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations"
  • Lack of self correction: scientific research programmes make mistakes, but they tend to eliminate these errors over time. [18]

Personalization of issues

  • Tight social groups and granfalloons. Authoritarian personality, suppression of dissent, and "groupthink" can enhance the adoption of beliefs that have no rational basis. The group tends to identify their critics as enemies.[19]
  • Assertion of claims of a conspiracy by the scientific community to suppress the results.[20]
  • Attacking the motives or character of anyone who questions the claims (Ad hominem fallacy).[19]

Some of these criticisms has also been levelled to areas that are regarded as part of conventional science. According to Churchland, "Most terms in theoretical physics, for example, do not enjoy at least some distinct connections with observables, but not of the simple sort that would permit operational definitions in terms of these observables. [..] If a restriction in favor of operational definitions were to be followed, therefore, most of theoretical physics would have to be dismissed as meaningless pseudoscience!" [21]

Some statements and commonly held beliefs in popular science may not meet the criteria of science. "Pop" science may blur the divide between science and pseudoscience among the general public, and may also involve science fiction.[10]

Pseudoscience contrasted with protoscience

Protoscience is a term sometimes used to describe a hypothesis that has not yet been adequately tested, but which is consistent with existing science or which offers a plausible account of any inconsistencies. It may also describe the transition from a body of practical knowledge into a scientific field. By contrast, "pseudoscience" is reserved to describe theories which are either untestable in practice or in principle, or which are maintained even when tests appear to have refuted them.

It is widely disputed (notably by Feyeraband, see above) whether any clear or meaningful boundaries can be drawn between pseudoscience, protoscience, and "real" science. When there is a significant cultural or historical distance (as, for example, modern chemistry reflecting on alchemy), protosciences can be misinterpreted as pseudoscientific. Often the term pseudoscience is used simply as a pejorative to express a low opinion of a given field, regardless of any objective measures; thus according to McNally, "The term “pseudoscience” has become little more than an inflammatory buzzword for quickly dismissing one’s opponents in media sound-bites." [22].

Demarcation problem and criticisms of the concept of pseudoscience

Despite broad agreement on the basics of the scientific method, the boundaries between science and non-science continue to be debated.[23] This is the problem of demarcation. Many philosophers question the rigor of the demarcation, as some disciplines now accepted as science previously had features cited as those of pseudoscience, such as lack of reproducibility, or the inability to create falsifiable experiments. It has been argued that experimental verification is not in itself decisive in scientific method. Thomas Kuhn states that in neither Popper's theory nor in his own does testing play a decisive role. Cite error: Closing </ref> missing for <ref> tag The latter proposed that a scientific theory must "account for all the phenomena that its rival background theory explains" and "must clash empirically with its rival by yielding test implications that are inconsistent with the rival theory". This is an explicitly competitive model of scientific work; Rothbart also notes that it is not a completely effective model[24].

The judgement of whether a theory is scientific or not depends upon its historical context; if it betters the current explanations of phenomena, it marks scientific progress. For example, many beliefs in ancient Greece that today are called superstitions were, at that time, clear examples of legitimate scientific beliefs.

Larry Laudan has suggested that pseudoscience has no scientific meaning: "If we would stand up and be counted on the side of reason, we ought to drop terms like ‘pseudo-science’ and ‘unscientific’ from our vocabulary; they are just hollow phrases which do only emotive work for us".[25]

The ubiquity of pseudoscientific thinking

The National Science Foundation stated that, in the USA, "pseudoscientific" beliefs became more widespread during the 1990's, peaked near 2001 and mildly declined since; nevertheless, pseudoscientific beliefs remain common in the USA.[26] As a result, according to the NSF report, there is a lack of knowledge of pseudoscientific issues in society and pseudoscientific practices are commonly followed. Bunge (1999) states that a 1988 survey showed that 50% of American adults rejected evolution, and 88% believed that astrology was a science.

Pseudoscience in psychology

Neurologists and clinical psychologists [27] are concerned about the increasing amount of what they consider pseudoscience promoted in psychotherapy and popular psychology, and also about what they see as pseudoscientific therapies such as Neuro-linguistic programming, Rebirthing, Reparenting, and Primal Scream Therapy being adopted by government and professional bodies and by the public. They state that scientifically unsupported therapies might harm vulnerable members of the public, undermine legitimate therapies, and tend to spread misconceptions about the nature of the mind and brain to society at large. Some psychiatrists and psychologists also perceive pseudoscientific ideas in more popularly accepted branches of psychotherapy, such as co-counselling, Gestalt Therapy, Re-evaluation Counseling and even in the work of Twelve-step program bodies such as Alcoholics Anonymous.

Psychological explanations for pseudoscientific beliefs

Pseudoscientific thinking has been explained in terms of psychology and social psychology. The human proclivity for seeking confirmation rather than refutation (confirmation bias) [28], the tendency to hold comforting beliefs, and the tendency to overgeneralize have been proposed as reasons for the common adherence to pseudoscientific thinking.

Notes

  1. Magendie, F (1843) An Elementary Treatise on Human Physiology. 5th Ed. Tr. John Revere. New York, Harper, p 150
  2. Gauch HG Jr (2003) Scientific Method in Practice
  3. Feyerabend P (1975) Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge [1]
  4. [2]
  5. [3][4]
  6. e.g. phrenology, see [ http://www.theness.com/articles.asp?id=40]
  7. Popper, KR (1959) "The Logic of Scientific Discovery" (English translation, 1959)[5].
  8. Popper KR "Science: Conjectures and Refutations"
  9. Popper KR (1962) Science, Pseudo-Science, and Falsifiability. Conjectures and Refutations
  10. Cover JA, Curd M (Eds, 1998) Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, 1-82
  11. Lakatos I (1970) "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." in Lakatos I, Musgrave A (eds) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge pp 91-195; Popper KR (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery
  12. e.g. [6] Macmilllan Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol 3, "Fallacies" 174 'ff, esp. section on "Ignoratio elenchi"
  13. Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol 3, "Fallacies" 174 'ff esp. 177-178
  14. Bunge M (1983) Demarcating science from pseudoscience Fundamenta Scientiae 3:369-388, 381
  15. Peer review and the acceptance of new scientific ideas (Warning 469 kB PDF)*Peer review – process, perspectives and the path ahead; Lilienfeld (2004) op cit For an opposing perspective, e.g. Peer Review as Scholarly Conformity
  16. Ruscio J (2001) Clear thinking with psychology: Separating sense from nonsense. Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth
  17. (1978) op cit
  18. name=Ruscio120>Ruscio J (2001) op cit. p120. By contrast, theories may be accused of being pseudoscientific because they have remained unaltered despite contradictory evidence. The work Scientists Confront Velikovsky (1976) Cornell University, also delves into these features in some detail, as does the work of Thomas Kuhn, e.g. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) which also discusses some of the items on the list of characteristics of pseudoscience.
  19. 19.0 19.1 Devilly GJ (2005) Power therapies and possible threats to the science of psychology and psychiatry Austral NZ J Psych 39:437-445(9) Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "Devilly" defined multiple times with different content
  20. e.g. archivefreedom.org which claims that "The list of suppressed scientists even includes Nobel Laureates!"
  21. Churchland P Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (1999) MIT Press. p.90.
  22. McNally RJ (2003)Is the pseudoscience concept useful for clinical psychology? SRHMP Vol 2 Number 2 Fall/Winter [7]
  23. Cover JA, Curd M (Eds, 1998) Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues 1-82
  24. Rothbart, Daniel, op cit pp 114-20
  25. Laudan L (1996) "The demise of the demarcation problem" in Ruse M But Is It Science?: The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy pp 337-350
  26. [8] National Science Board. 2006. Science and Engineering Indicators 2006 Two volumes. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation (volume 1, NSB-06-01; NSB 06-01A)
  27. e.g. Drenth (2003) [9]; Herbert JD et al (2000) Science and pseudoscience in the development of eye movement desensitization and reprocessing: implications for clinical psychology Clin Psychol Rev 20:945-71 [PMID 11098395])
  28. (Devilly 2005:439)

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