Financial regulation: Difference between revisions

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==Post-crash proposals==
==Post-crash proposals==
===Micro- and macroprudential regulation===


<ref>[http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf ''The Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis'', Financial Services Authority, March 2009]</ref>
===Problems and remedies===
====Leverage====


<ref>[http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp09_04.pdf ''Turner Review Conference Discussion Paper: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis: systemically important banks and assessing the cumulative impact'', Financial Services Authority, October 2009]</ref>
====Risk management====


====Asset-price bubbles====


<ref>[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/pdf/c3.pdf ''Lessons for Monetary Problems from Asset Price Fluctuations'',  (World Economic Outlook October 2009 Chapter 3) International Monetary Fund 2009]</ref>.
====Too-big-to-fail====


<ref>[http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/research/warwickcommission/report/swc_report.pdf ''The Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform: In Praise of Unlevel Playing Fields'', (The report of the second Warwick Commission) University of Warwick, November 2009]</ref>.
====Bonus incentives====


<ref>[http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/financialstability/roleofmacroprudentialpolicy091121.pdf ''The Role of Macroprudential Policy'', a discussion paper, Bank of England, November 2009]</ref>
====Credit ratings====


==The authorities' reactions==
====Mark-to-market accounting====


<ref>[http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Speeches/2002/20021015/default.htm Ben Bernanke: ''Asset-Price "Bubbles" and Monetary Policy'' (Speech to the New York Chapter of the National Association for Business Economics, New York, New York, October 15 2002) Federal  Reserve Board 2002]</ref>; and in a 2005 lecture, Jean-Claude Trichet,  the President of the European Central Bank, argued that not all  bubbles threaten financial stability, and that if  policy-makers attempted  to eliminate all risk from the financial system, they either fail or they would  "hamper the appropriate functioning of a market economy"<ref>[http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2005/html/sp050608.en.html Jean-Claude Trichet: ''Asset price bubbles and monetary policy'',(Mas lecture, 8 June 2005) European Central Bank, 2005]</ref>.
<ref>[http://www.bis.org/review/r090826a.pdf Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada: ''Some Considerations on Using Monetary Policy to Stabilize Economic Activity'', (Speech to the Foreign Policy Association, New York, 19 November 2009)Bank for International Settlements, 2009]</ref>, and by Federal Reserve  Board Governor Frederic Mishkin <ref>[http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/mishkin20080515a.htm Frederic Mishkin: ''How Should We Respond to Asset Price Bubbles'', Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, October 2008]</ref>


==Policy decisions==
==Policy decisions==

Revision as of 11:24, 3 December 2009

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Background: pre-crash financial regulation

Governments have long been aware of the danger that a loss of confidence following the failure of one bank could lead to the failure of others, and to limit that danger they traditionally required all banks to maintain minimum reserve ratios. Following the crash of 1929 they also imposed restrictions upon the activities of the commercial banks. In the United States, for example, the Glass-Steagall Act prohibiting their participation in the activities of investment banks. In the 1980s, however, there was a general move toward "deregulation", those restrictions were dropped and reserve requirements were relaxed. There followed a period of financial innovation and substantial change in the nature of banking[1]. The perception of a resulting increase in danger of systemic failure led, in 1988, to the publication of a set of regulatory recommendations that related a bank's required reserve ratio to the riskiness of its loans [2] and, in 2004, to revised recommendations [3] requiring banks to take more detailed account of the riskiness of their loans. Those recommendations were widely adopted, but their inadequacy was revealed by the crash of 2008 when the global banking system suffered its "most severe instability since the outbreak of World War I" [4]. and threatened the collapse of its entire financial system. That narrowly-averted catastrophe prompted the urgent consideration of measures to remedy the deficiencies of the regulatory system. Recognition of the international character of the problem led to the inauguration of a series of G20 summits, initially to formulate measures to combat the recession of 2008 and subsequently to consider measures to reduce the danger of a future collapse of the international financial system.

Post-crash proposals

Micro- and macroprudential regulation

Problems and remedies

Leverage

Risk management

Asset-price bubbles

Too-big-to-fail

Bonus incentives

Credit ratings

Mark-to-market accounting

Policy decisions

References