Air operations against North Vietnam: Difference between revisions

From Citizendium
Jump to navigation Jump to search
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz
mNo edit summary
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz
(Cleanup and extension)
Line 2: Line 2:
{{TOC|right}}
{{TOC|right}}
During the [[Vietnam War]], the United States conducted extensive '''air operations against North Vietnam''', but few, until 1972, had decisive effect. Earlier in the war, the objectives, and to a large extent the tactics, were dictated by political leaders without understanding of [[air warfare planning|air warfare]], and, to a significant extent, a lack of understanding of the [[Vietnamese Communist grand strategy]] and how the leadership interpreted U.S. actions.
During the [[Vietnam War]], the United States conducted extensive '''air operations against North Vietnam''', but few, until 1972, had decisive effect. Earlier in the war, the objectives, and to a large extent the tactics, were dictated by political leaders without understanding of [[air warfare planning|air warfare]], and, to a significant extent, a lack of understanding of the [[Vietnamese Communist grand strategy]] and how the leadership interpreted U.S. actions.
Both [[signaling strategy]] and [[compellence]] played a role in the [[Lyndon B. Johnson|Johnson Administration]]'s goals, although the compellence was of an atypical nature in international relations theory (i.e., #3 below)  Assumptions changed, however, when the [[Richard M. Nixon|Nixon Administration]] took over and included #2. <ref name=Bratton>{{citation
| title = When is coercion successful? And why can't we agree on it?
| journal = Naval War College Review
| date = Summer, 2005
| author = Patrick C. Bratton
| url = http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_3_58/ai_n15674371/
}}</ref>
# "Coercive diplomacy" separate from the use of force, discussed by [[Alexander George]] and [[Janice Gross Stein]]: that which happens before "the first bomb is dropped". The actual use of force, as in deterrence, signifies failure, but the truly difficult part is exercising a [[signaling strategy]] understandable to all sides.
#coercion exercised almost entirely through the use of force (normally air power), in the works of [[Robert Pape]], [[Daniel Byman]], and [[Matthew Waxman]]; an example is the [[Second World War]] strategic bombing of Japan. A challenge here is  that it is "hard to distinguish clearly between coercion and brute force given the scale and intensity of the conflicts studied."
# coercion exercised by both diplomacy and force, discussed by Schelling, [[Daniel Ellsberg]], [[Wallace Thies]], and [[Lawrence Freedman]]; an example is  that of the "Lyndon Johnson administration to coerce the North Vietnamese government to cease its support of the Viet Cong insurgents in South Vietnam in the 1960s. In the view of a scholar who has traced this attempt, there is no sharp break between, first, coercive diplomatic efforts backed by very limited and covert use of force in 1963-64; second, limited demonstrative uses of force in reprisals after the Gulf of Tonkin incident; and third, the escalating air campaign of [[Operation ROLLING THUNDER]]."
Bundy said, "the fact that the President had not had formal diplomatic experience
to any great extent was no true measure of the degree of his exposure to major questions
in foreign affairs...there was certainly a gap in his experience in the sense that
he was not widely and easily acquainted with the people concerned with the conduct and
management of international affairs both in the United States and outside the United
States.<ref name=LBJ-Oral-Bundy1>{{citation
| url = http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/Ball-G/Ball-g1.pdf
| date=  January 1, 1969
| title = Oral History Interview with McGeorge Bundy, Interview 1
| author = Mullholan, Paige E.}}, pp. I-1 to I-2</ref>
Johnson saw the war in terms of its effects on domestic politics and made decisions based on domestic considerations. He did not want to be known as the Democrat who "lost Vietnam." As a believer in the "domino theory," he worried that other countries in Southeast Asia would fall to Communism if the line was not held.
The only alternative to containment, he believed, was rollback, as advocated by [[Barry Goldwater]]. "Why Not Victory?" Goldwater asked; because it means nuclear war, Johnson retorted, as he used the rollback issue to overwhelm Goldwater in the 1964 election.<ref name=ThisDay>{{citation
| date = September 22, 1964
| title = Goldwater attacks Johnson's Vietnam policy
| author = The History Channel
| url = http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history.do?action=Article&id=1373
}}</ref>  To be consistent with Johnson's policies, the Air Force revised its manual of air doctrine, to state that "total victory in some situations would be an unreasonable goal."<ref>{{citation | first = John W. | last = Pauly | title = The Thread of Doctrine | url = http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1976/may-jun/pauly.html | journal = Air University Review| date =  May-June 1976}}</ref>
==Aftermath of the [[Gulf of Tonkin incident]]==
==Aftermath of the [[Gulf of Tonkin incident]]==
While aircraft attacked North Vietnamese [[fast attack craft]] in international waters, Operation PIERCE ARROW was the formal name for the retaliatory attack against naval bases, and an oil refinery at [[Vinh]].
While aircraft attacked North Vietnamese [[fast attack craft]] in international waters, Operation PIERCE ARROW was the formal name for the retaliatory attack against naval bases, and an oil refinery at [[Vinh]].
Line 14: Line 45:


==Commitment to major strikes==
==Commitment to major strikes==
The LINEBACKER operations of 1972, following a bombing halt, moved from the third to the second compelence strategy. LINEBACKER II, in particular, literally destroyed -- after tactical adjustments -- North Vietnamese operational capability. LINEBACKER I had significantly disrupted the ability of North Vietnam to send troops and supplies to the south.
{{r|Operation LINEBACKER I}}
{{r|Operation LINEBACKER I}}
{{r|Operation LINEBACKER II}}
{{r|Operation LINEBACKER II}}
==References==
{{reflist|2}}

Revision as of 11:16, 18 February 2011

This article is developing and not approved.
Main Article
Discussion
Definition [?]
Related Articles  [?]
Bibliography  [?]
External Links  [?]
Citable Version  [?]
 
This editable Main Article is under development and subject to a disclaimer.

During the Vietnam War, the United States conducted extensive air operations against North Vietnam, but few, until 1972, had decisive effect. Earlier in the war, the objectives, and to a large extent the tactics, were dictated by political leaders without understanding of air warfare, and, to a significant extent, a lack of understanding of the Vietnamese Communist grand strategy and how the leadership interpreted U.S. actions.

Both signaling strategy and compellence played a role in the Johnson Administration's goals, although the compellence was of an atypical nature in international relations theory (i.e., #3 below) Assumptions changed, however, when the Nixon Administration took over and included #2. [1]

  1. "Coercive diplomacy" separate from the use of force, discussed by Alexander George and Janice Gross Stein: that which happens before "the first bomb is dropped". The actual use of force, as in deterrence, signifies failure, but the truly difficult part is exercising a signaling strategy understandable to all sides.
  2. coercion exercised almost entirely through the use of force (normally air power), in the works of Robert Pape, Daniel Byman, and Matthew Waxman; an example is the Second World War strategic bombing of Japan. A challenge here is that it is "hard to distinguish clearly between coercion and brute force given the scale and intensity of the conflicts studied."
  3. coercion exercised by both diplomacy and force, discussed by Schelling, Daniel Ellsberg, Wallace Thies, and Lawrence Freedman; an example is that of the "Lyndon Johnson administration to coerce the North Vietnamese government to cease its support of the Viet Cong insurgents in South Vietnam in the 1960s. In the view of a scholar who has traced this attempt, there is no sharp break between, first, coercive diplomatic efforts backed by very limited and covert use of force in 1963-64; second, limited demonstrative uses of force in reprisals after the Gulf of Tonkin incident; and third, the escalating air campaign of Operation ROLLING THUNDER."

Bundy said, "the fact that the President had not had formal diplomatic experience to any great extent was no true measure of the degree of his exposure to major questions in foreign affairs...there was certainly a gap in his experience in the sense that he was not widely and easily acquainted with the people concerned with the conduct and management of international affairs both in the United States and outside the United States.[2]

Johnson saw the war in terms of its effects on domestic politics and made decisions based on domestic considerations. He did not want to be known as the Democrat who "lost Vietnam." As a believer in the "domino theory," he worried that other countries in Southeast Asia would fall to Communism if the line was not held.

The only alternative to containment, he believed, was rollback, as advocated by Barry Goldwater. "Why Not Victory?" Goldwater asked; because it means nuclear war, Johnson retorted, as he used the rollback issue to overwhelm Goldwater in the 1964 election.[3] To be consistent with Johnson's policies, the Air Force revised its manual of air doctrine, to state that "total victory in some situations would be an unreasonable goal."[4]

Aftermath of the Gulf of Tonkin incident

While aircraft attacked North Vietnamese fast attack craft in international waters, Operation PIERCE ARROW was the formal name for the retaliatory attack against naval bases, and an oil refinery at Vinh.

Intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance

There was substantial use of unmanned aerial vehicles, principally for imagery intelligence but possibly also for signals intelligence. A limited number of SR-71 Blackbird sorties were flown for strategic imagery, and fighter-reconnaissance aircraft flew battle damage assessment missions.

RC-135 COMBAT SENT aircraft collected electronic intelligence and mapped with side-looking radar.

The time of signaling

Commitment to major strikes

The LINEBACKER operations of 1972, following a bombing halt, moved from the third to the second compelence strategy. LINEBACKER II, in particular, literally destroyed -- after tactical adjustments -- North Vietnamese operational capability. LINEBACKER I had significantly disrupted the ability of North Vietnam to send troops and supplies to the south.

References

  1. Patrick C. Bratton (Summer, 2005), "When is coercion successful? And why can't we agree on it?", Naval War College Review
  2. Mullholan, Paige E. (January 1, 1969), Oral History Interview with McGeorge Bundy, Interview 1, pp. I-1 to I-2
  3. The History Channel (September 22, 1964), Goldwater attacks Johnson's Vietnam policy
  4. Pauly, John W. (May-June 1976), "The Thread of Doctrine", Air University Review